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Board Games: Germany's Monopoly* on
the Two-Tier System of Corporate
Governance and Why the Post-Enron United
States Would Benefit From Its Adoption
Cherie J. Owen**
In the wake of the recent corporate scandals such as Enron and
WorldCom,l investors have lost faith in the stability of the American se-
curities markets.2 Consequently, stock prices have rapidly declined over
the past year and investors have lost billions of dollars.3  Corporations
* Other countries, such as Austria, Holland, and Indonesia also have a form of
two-tier board, sometimes referred to as a "compound" board or a "split" board.
** J.D. Candidate, Dickinson School of Law, 2004; B.A. in Political Science,
summa cum laude, Edinboro University of Pennsylvania, 2001. 1 would like to thank my
family, especially my mother, Sally, and my sister, Heather, for their continuous love and
encouragement. I would also like to extend special thanks to Larry CatA Backer, Profes-
sor of Law at Dickinson School of Law, for helping me to develop this topic and for his
constant support and encouragement. I would also like to thank Dr. Robert Rhodes, my
professor, mentor, and friend at Edinboro University, for inspiring me to pursue the study
of law and challenging me to excel.
1. In addition to Enron and WorldCom, the recent bankruptcies of Kmart and
Global Crossing have also unnerved investors. Jake Ulick, Wall St. Gets 'Enron-itis',
CNN MONEY, Jan. 29, 2002 at
http://money.cnn.com/2002/01/29/markets/marketsnewyork/. Furthermore, several
companies have recently been under investigation, including Tyco, Rite Aid, Xerox,
Adelphia Communications, Qwest Communications, Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia,
ImClone Systems, Waste Management, Inc., Peregrine Systems, Inc., and Micro Strategy.
Marco Nunez, Corporate Accounting, at
http://www.willamette.edu/cla/rhetoric/workshop/DebateResearch/marconunez.doc (last
visited Jan. 14, 2003).
2. See Robert F. Felton & Mark Watson, Change Across the Board, MCKINSEY
QUARTERLY, 2002, no.4, available at
http://mckinseyquarterly.com/articlepage.asp?ar= 1229&L2=21 &L3=37&srid=7&gp=
(last visited Nov. 30, 2002) (stating that "a swath of scandals has eroded trust in US cor-
porate conduct to levels last seen a century ago .... [and a] handful of the highest-profile
scandals have called into question the integrity of US capitalism"); see also Steven Pearl-
stein, Firms Enter Reform Mode On Their Own, WASH. POST, July 9, 2002 available at
http://www.corp.ca.gov/pressrel/itnfmfO70902wp.htm (last visited January 14, 2002)
(stating that corporate scandals have shattered faith in American business).
3. Alan Reynolds, More Beltway Madness, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE, Aug. 6,
2002 at http://nationalreview.com/nrof comment/comment-reynolds8O6O2.asp (stating
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
are currently experiencing difficulty finding willing investors because
potential investors fear that any corporation could be the next Enron.4 In
the midst of this paranoia, the business world seems to be looking for an
answer to the following question: "How can we prevent this from hap-
pening again, and at the same time, assure investors that the market is
safe? ' 5 One way of improving the corporate system is to improve the
structure of corporate governance.
Rather than starting from scratch, legislators should look to the cor-
porate governance structures of other countries.6 The basic corporate
form, that of a company with perpetual existence and limited liability for
its owners, is common to many countries, yet each country has ap-
proached the problems faced by corporate America differently.
Germany, for example, has a corporate structure that separates those
who manage the business of the corporation from those who oversee the
management. This governance structure ensures more accountability for
managers of the corporation's business. The idea of separating manage-
ment from those who oversee management is an appealing one; there-
fore, U.S. legislators should look to the corporate structure of Germany
for guidance in improving the American system.
7
that the market began to slide on March 20, 2002, and the steepest drop began on July 8,
2002, and continued for weeks).
4. Ulick, supra note 1 (quoting Patrick Boyle, trader at Credit Suisse First Boston,
as saying "No one wants to be the next Enron"); Holden Lewis, Investors' Fear of Enron
Sequel Helps Mortgage Shoppers, CBS MARKET WATCH at
http://www.bankrate.com/cbsmw/news/mtga/20020221 a.asp?prodtype=mtg (stating
"Definitely, there is an impact from the Enron crisis and the fear in equity markets that it
has created") (last visited Jan. 14, 2003).
5. See Bruce A. Hiler et al., Criminalizing Business Judgment Could Stagnate U.S.
Economy, ANDREWS ENRON LITIG. REP., Sept. 3, 2002 (stating that "the collapse of Enron
has resulted in an avalanche of reform proposals from all comers of Washington ....
Congress has at least forty new proposals pending before it, regulators have proposed
dozens of rule changes, and even the White House has offered its own 'Ten Point Plan'
of proposed reforms").
6. The comparative method of problem-solving is not an uncommon approach, but
rather one frequently used in the United States:
American lawyers are natural comparativists. American lawyers, judges and
legislators look to other jurisdictions for solutions to similar problems .... the
American legal system is accustomed to the use of the comparative method: (i)
as a model, (ii) to gain perspective; (iii) as a means to harmonize the laws be-
tween jurisdictions; or (iv) as part of a plan of unification of the law
LARRY CATA BACKER, COMPARATIVE CORPORATE LAW 4-5 (Carolina Academic Press)
(2002).
7. Although a stagnant economy such as Germany's can be a result of a poor sys-
tem of corporate governance, see Matthew Senechal, Comment, Reforming the Japanese
Commercial Code.- A Step Towards an American-Style Executive Officer System in Ja-
pan?, 12 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 535, 535 (2003) (implying that a country's form of cor-
porate governance can transform an economy), Germany's stagnant economy has been
attributed to other factors, such as rising unemployment, tax increases, and the threat of
war. German Economy Stagnant, CNN BusINEss, at
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Section I of this comment will explain some of the events that have
created the need for corporate governance reform in the United States.
Sections II and III will examine the basic structures of corporate govern-
ance in the United States and in Germany. Section IV will then examine
some of the attempts to reform corporate governance structure in the
United States. Finally, Section V will advocate the adoption of a modi-
fied two-tier system of corporate governance in the United States and
explain why Germany's major problems with the two-tier structure could
be avoided if the system were implemented in the United States.
I. Events Creating the Need for Internal Corporate Governance
Reform8
The United States has experienced a recent explosion of corporate
collapses, many caused by false or misleading financial statements and
executive misconduct. The chairman and CEO of the investment bank-
ing firm of Goldman Sachs recently remarked "I cannot think of a time
when business overall has been held in less repute." 9 Some of the most
notable recent collapses have involved Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia,
Tyco, and Global Crossing.
A. Enron
Enron was an "old line" energy company that reinvented itself in
the 1990's as an energy trading company whose primary business was
trading in assorted energy mediums.'° The corporation used accounting
strategies to misconstrue its financial situation. 1' It created "special pur-
pose entities" (SPEs) which financed Enron's activities, shifted debt
from Enron's books, and hid Enron's credit risk. 12 These SPEs were
used in many different ways to disguise risk and debt, and to create the
appearance of liquidity and profitability. 13 Some of Enron's SPEs were
http://www.cnn.com/2003/BUSINESS/02/26/german.gdp/ (Feb. 26, 2003).
8. For a brief overview of recent corporate scandals, see Jeffrey Reiman & Paul
Leighton, Getting Tough on Corporate Crime? Enron and a Year of Corporate Finan-
cial Scandals, at http://www.paulsjusticepage.com/RichGetRicher/fraud/chart.htm (last
visited May 21, 2003).
9. Patrick McGeehan, Goldman Chief Urges Reforms in Corporations, N.Y. TIMES,
June 6, 2002, at Al.
10. David S. Ruder, Lessons from Enron: Director and Lawyer Monitoring Respon-
sibilities prepared for the 41st Annual Corporate Counsel Institute, Chicago Illinois,
available at
http://www.law.northwestem.edu/depts/contexec/cle/corpcounseU/Ruder-Lessons-Enron.
pdf (October 10, 2002).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See Julie Creswell, Banks on the Hot Seat, FORTUNE, Aug. 11, 2002,
http://www.fortune.com/fortune/articles/0,15114,368199-2,00.html (last visited Jan. 14,
2003]
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managed by Andrew Fastow, the chief financial officer (CFO) of En-
ron.
14
In October of 2001, after Enron's auditor reviewed one of the SPEs
and decided that the accounting had been incorrect, Enron announced it
was taking a $544 million after-tax charge against earnings, and recog-
nized that in prior transactions it had improperly recorded $1.2 billion in
notes receivable transactions. 15 The next month, Enron announced a re-
statement of earnings and an increase in debt for the years 1997 to
2000.16 Earnings were reduced by $28 million for 1997, $133 million for
1998, $153 million for 1999, and $91 million for the year 2000.1" Re-
ported debt was increased by $711 million for 1997, $561 million for
1998, $685 million for 1999, and $628 million for the year 2000.18 The
restatements of earnings and increased debt caused a collapse in Enron's
ability to trade in the energy markets. 19 Stock that had been selling be-
tween $80 and $90 per share during the year 2000 became worthless, and
as a result, Enron filed for bankruptcy in December of 2001.20
B. WorldCom
WorldCom announced in June, 2002, that it had overstated earnings
by over $3.8 billion in the five previous quarters. 21 This overstatement
was in part due to a strategy of treating operating costs as capital invest-
ments. 22 In addition to the restatement of earnings, WorldCom also an-
nounced that it would eliminate twenty percent of its work force.2 3
WorldCom's market capitalization fell from over $115 billion to less
than $1 billion.24
2003).





19. Ruder, supra note 10.
20. Joel Seligman, No One Can Serve Two Masters: Corporate and Securities Law
After Enron, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 449, 453-54 (2002).
21. Press Release, WorldCom (June 25, 2002),
http://global.mci.com/news/news2.xml?newsid=3230&mode=long&lang=en&width=530
&root=-/&langlinks=off (last visited Arp. 30, 2003).
22. See Preliminary Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on Corpo-
rate Responsibility, July 16, 2002,
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/corporateresponsibility/prelimaryreport.pdf (last visited
May 20, 2003) [hereinafter ABA Report].
23. See id.
24. See Simon Romero & Alex Berenson, WorldCom Says It Hid Expenses, Inflating
Cash Flow $3.8 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2002, at Al.
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C. Adelphia Communications
In the spring of 2002, Adelphia Communications admitted that it
had guaranteed loans of $2.3 billion to family members of its controlling
shareholders. 25 In June, 2002, Adelphia filed for protection under Chap-
ter 11 bankruptcy laws, 26 causing its stock to fall from a high of nearly
$28 per share to a low of $0.01 per share.27
D. Tyco International
In 2002, the former CEO of Tyco International was indicted on
charges of state sales tax evasion.28 The indictment, coupled with con-
cerns about the use of corporate funds for the personal benefit of the
CEO and general counsel of the corporation, caused Tyco International's
market capitalization to fall by $100 billion in 2002.29
E. Global Crossing Ltd.
After Global Crossing Ltd. filed for bankruptcy, the former chair-
man and founder of the corporation was questioned regarding sales of
over $700 million of his stock in the corporation in 1999.30 At the time
of the sale, the stock had reached a high of $60 per share. However, by
the end of 2001, the company filed for bankruptcy following allegations
that the corporations's revenues were inflated due to exchanges that were
without economic substance.
31
II. Basic Corporate Governance in the United States
The American corporate governance structure is a one-tier system,
also known as a unitary board system. 32 The main participants in gov-
ernance of American corporations are officers, directors, and sharehold-
ers. Although corporate law differs among the states, the general default
structure of corporate governance features certain predominant character-
istics present in corporations of every state.
25. See Joseph B. Treaster, Adelphia Files for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, June 26,
2002, at C2.
26. See id.
27. See Peter Lauria, Adelphia Bottoms Out, THE DAILY DEAL, June 27, 2002.
28. See Alex Berenson, Ex-Tyco Chief a Big Risk Taker, Now Confronts the Legal
System, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2002 at C1.
29. See id.
30. See Jill Stewart, Master of Disaster: How L.A. 's Super-rich Gary Winnick is Try-
ing to Wash Blood from the Global Crossing Implosion off his Hands-and Make More
Money in the Bargain, NEW TIMES L.A., April 25, 2002.
31. See id.
32. See generally Detlev F. Vagts, Reforming the "Modern " Corporation: Perspec-
tives from the German, 80 HARV. L. REv. 23, 53 (1966).
2003]
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A. The Board of Directors
The board of directors of an American corporation has primary re-
sponsibility for overseeing the business and affairs of the corporation. 33
The board is ultimately responsible for safeguarding the well-being of
the corporation.34 In the past, corporate governance norms required that
boards of directors manage the business of the corporation. Today, how-
ever, the board does not have the ability or resources to manage the cor-
poration.35 Today's boards are primarily monitoring boards, whose main
function is to select, evaluate, fix the compensation of, and replace the
senior executives. 36 The board also monitors the conduct of the corpora-
tion's business activities to evaluate whether the business is managed
properly. 37 Whatever form the board takes, it continues to wield ultimate
authority over, and responsibility for, decisions concerning the corpora-
38tion.
B. The Officers
Responsibility for a corporation's day-to-day activities is often
delegated to one or more officers who act as agents of the corporation, or
more specifically, as agents of the board, which is the personification of
the corporation. 39 The corporate codes of the United States allow the
corporation's directors to determine, either in the by-laws or through
33. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1999) [hereinafter DGCL] (stating that
"[tihe business and affairs of every corporation... shall be managed by or under the di-
rection of a board of directors, except as may otherwise provided in this chapter or in its
certificate of incorporation); REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (1984) [hereinaf-
ter RMBCA] (stating that "[a]ll corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the au-
thority of, and the business and affairs of the corporation managed by or under the direc-
tion of, its boards of directors...")
34. See DGCL, supra note 33, § 141(a); RMBCA, supra note 33, § 8.01(b).
35. Charles M. Nathan, Overkill, THE DAILY DEAL, Sept. 14, 2002 at
http://www.lw.com/resource/publications/_pdf/pub474.pdf (stating that "the board does
not have the time, resources or skills to manage the modem corporation").
36. See RMBCA supra note 33, § 8.01(b) official cmt. (stating that "in most corpo-
rations ... the role of the board of directors consists principally of the formulation of pol-
icy, the selection of the chief executive officer and other key officers, and the approval of
major actions or transactions").
37. Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REv.
1253, 1278 (1999) (stating that until about twenty years ago, the dominant model of the
board was that of a managing board, which was hopelessly unrealistic, because part-time
directors cannot manage the business of, or even set business policy for, a complex enter-
prise).
38. DGCL, supra note 33, § 141(a); RMBCA, supra note 33, § 8.01(b).
39. ENNo W. ERCKLENTZ, JR., MODERN GERMAN CORPORATION LAW VOL. 1 at 90
(Oceana Publ'ns 1979); see DGCL, supra note 33, § 142(a) (stating that officers have
"such duties as stated in the by-laws or in a resolution of the board of directors...");
RMBCA, supra note 33, § 8.41 (stating that "[elach officer has the authority and shall
perform duties set forth in the by-laws or... prescribed by the board of directors").
[Vol. 22:1
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resolution, the number of officers the corporation will have and the titles
of those officers. 40 However, both the Delaware General Corporations
Law (DGCL) and the Revised Model Business Corporation Act
(RMBCA) require corporations to have at least one officer who functions
as the corporation's "secretary. 41
While the board has the statutory authority to create its officers,
give them appropriate titles, and delegate to them any combination of du-
ties, few public corporations stray far from the standard model of gov-
ernance. In this standard model, the chief executive officer (CEO), is the
highest ranking officer and has the authority to bind the corporation in
transactions entered into in the ordinary course of business. Most corpo-
rations are reluctant to adopt a model that greatly deviates from the stan-
dard because deviation results in uncertainty, which increases transaction
costs. 42 Furthermore, courts will sometimes adopt the presumption that
the person titled president or CEO has the authority to bind the corpora-
tion, even if the board of directors did not delegate those particular pow-
ers to the person with that title.43 In the United States, the chairman of
the board of directors (chairman) and the chief executive officer are often
the same individual.
C. The Shareholders
Although the shareholders are the owners of the corporation, they
have a very limited role. Robert Thompson sums up the role of the
shareholder in an American corporation in one sentence: "They can
vote, sell, or sue."' 44 Shareholders have the power to elect and to remove
directors45 and to vote on some fundamental changes to the corporation.
46
40. DGCL, supra note 33, § 142(a) (stating that every corporation organized under
this chapter shall have such officers with such titles and duties as shall be stated in the
by-laws or in a resolution of the board of directors); RMBCA, supra note 33, § 8.40(a)
(stating that a corporation has the offices described in its by-laws or designated by the
board of directors).
41. DGCL, supra note 33, § 142(a) (stating that one of the officers shall have the
duty to record the proceedings of the meetings of the stockholders and directors);
RMBCA, supra note 33, § 8.40(c) (stating that the by-laws or board of directors must
assign to one of the officers responsibility for preparing minutes of the directors' and
shareholders' meetings and for maintaining and authenticating the records of the corpora-
tion required to be kept).
42. Cf Cecile C. Edwards, Of Equity, Continuation and the De Facto Merger Doc-
trine: Reflections on Mississippi Law and Successor Liability, 20 MiSS. C.L. REv. 307,
307 (2000) (noting that the creation of uncertainty increases transaction costs).
43. See Lee v. Jenkins Brothers, 268 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1959).
44. Robert B. Thompson, Preemption and Federalism in Corporate Governance:
Protecting Shareholder Rights to Vote, Sell and Sue, 62 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 215, 216
(1999).
45. Shareholders may remove a director with or without cause, unless the articles of
incorporation state that directors may only be removed for cause. In any case, the share-
2003]
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Shareholders have the power to adopt, amend, and repeal the corpora-
tion's bylaws,47 but they do not have the power to initiate or compel ac-
tion.48 Furthermore, their only control over managers is indirect: man-
agers are appointed by the board of directors, and the shareholders elect
the directors.
III. Basic Corporate Governance in Germany
The German legal system establishes two different forms of corpo-
rations. The first, the Gesellschaft mit beschraenkter Haftung (GmbH) is
similar to the American version of the close corporation.49 GmbHs are
governed by the Gesetz betreffend die Gesellschaften mit beschraenkter
Haftung (GmbH law). 50 The second kind of corporation, the Aktienge-
sellschaft (AG), is similar to the American version of a publicly traded
corporation and is governed by the Aktiengesetz (AktG).51 This comment
will focus on the AG, which is most comparable to the American pub-
holders may not be deprived of the right to remove directors for cause. DGCL, supra
note 33, § 141(k); RMBCA, supra note 33, §§ 8.04, 8.08(a).
46. DGCL, supra note 33, § 271(a) (stating that a sale, lease or exchange of all or
substantially all of the corporation's property and assets must be authorized by an abso-
lute majority of the shareholders); RMBCA, supra note 33, § 12.02(a) (stating that a sale,
lease or other disposition of assets excluding those described in § 12.01, requires the ap-
proval of the corporation's shareholders if the disposition would leave the corporation
without a significant continuing business activity. However, if the corporation retains a
business activity that represented at least twenty-five percent of total assets and twenty-
five percent of either income from continuing operations or revenues from continuing
operations, the corporation will conclusively be deemed to have retained a significant
continuing business activity).
47. DGCL, supra note 33, § 363(a); RMBCA, supra note 33, § 10.20.
48. See Auer v. Dressel, 118 N.E.2d 590, 593 (N.Y. 1954).
49. The GmbH greatly outnumbers the AG. At the end of 1998, there were ap-
proximately 4000 AGs and approximately 800,000 GmbHs in existence. HANNES
SCHNEIDER & MARTIN HEIDENHAIN, THE GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION ACT (2d ed. Klu-
wer Law Intn'l 2000). The definition of a close corporation in the United States varies
from state to state. However, many states provide that close corporations are typified by
a small number of stockholders, no ready market for the corporation's stock, and a sub-
stantial majority of the shareholders participate in the management, direction and opera-
tion of the corporation. See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328
N.E.2d 505, 511 (Mass. 1975) (citing Galler v. Galler, 203 N.E.2d 577 (Ill. 1964)). Close
corporations in the United States are often governed by general corporate laws, with spe-
cial provisions added to allow more flexibility for the close corporation. In some states
these provisions apply automatically if a corporation fits that state's definition of a close
corporation. In others, the corporation must satisfy certain criteria, and elect to be treated
as a close corporation.
50. The GmbH law is quite different from the stock corporation law, especially in
such areas as management structure, transferability of ownership, and degree of formal-
ity. See ERCKLENTZ, supra note 39, at 11.
51. There is also a less-favored, hybrid form of enterprise known as the Kommandit-
gesellschaft aufAktien ("KGaA"), which is governed by the stock corporation law, and
functions like the American limited partnership.
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licly traded corporation . 2
The AG has a two-tier board system which consists of a Vorstand 3
(management board), and an Aufsichtsrat54 (supervisory board).5  Ger-
man corporate law draws a strict line between these two organs, requir-
ing that membership in the two boards be mutually exclusive.56 Under
German law, a member of the management board of a corporation is
prohibited from also sitting on the supervisory board of the same corpo-
57ration. This is the major difference between a unitary board, such as
that of a United States corporation, and a two-tier board, such as that of a
German corporation: in a unitary board, a member of the board of direc-
tors may also be an officer; in a two-tier board, a member of the supervi-
sory board may not sit as a member of the managing board, or vice versa.
There are two other major differences between the corporate gov-
ernance in Germany and that of the United States. In Germany, labor has
a function in the corporation's governance structure, a principle called
codetermination 5 8  Additionally, German financial institutions play a
much larger role in the governance of German corporations. 59
A. The Supervisory Board in German Corporate Governance
The principle duty of the supervisory board is to appoint a Vorstand
(management board), and to oversee and monitor the Vorstand's man-
52. The proposal for a two-tiered board system does not apply to the United States
close corporation. The close corporation is often run by only a handful of people, who
often serve as majority shareholders, officers, and executives. Consequently it is neces-
sary for each person to wear many different hats, and would be impractical to mandate
strict separation between the members of the board and executives.
53. Aktiengesetz § 76(1) [hereinafter AktG] (Germany's stock corporation law),
available in translation in HANNES SCHNEIDER & MARTIN HEIDENHAIN, THE GERMAN
STOCK CORPORATION ACT (2d. ed. 2000).
54. AktG, supra note 53, § 90.
55. The two-tier system of corporate governance has been in place in Germany for
over 130 years, since 1870. See Manuel Rene' Theisen & Wolfgang Salzberger, Ger-
many's "Aufsichisrat'" Board: Three Ideas for the "Two-Tier" Approach, Legamedia,
Articles, Business, at http://www.legamedia.net/legamall/2002/02-02/0202_theissen-
salzberger-aufsichtsrat e.php (last visited Jan. 14, 2003).
56. AktG, supra note 53, § 105.
57. Id. (stating that a member of the supervisor board may not also be a member of
the management board, a permanent deputy member of the management board, a regis-
tered authorized officer, or general manager of the company).
58. There have been 4 major codetermination laws enacted. Their general purpose is
to ensure representation of employees of certain corporations on the supervisory boards
of those corporations. For more information on codetermination, see infra note 65.
59. See Benjamin J. Richardson, Enlisting Institutional Investors in Environmental
Regulation: Some Comparative and Theoretical Perspectives, 28 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM.
REG. 247, 305 (2002) (stating that the German model of corporate governance views the
existence of multiple financial relationships as offering superior avenues for investor in-
fluence).
2003]
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agement of the AG.60 Accordingly, the supervisory board does not have
the authority to declare dividends, as does its United States counterpart. 6'
In accordance with the supervisory board's power to oversee the
management of the corporation, German corporate law requires that the
management board report to the supervisory board on several important
issues. These issues include the management board's intended business
policy and other fundamental matters regarding the future strategy of the
company, the profitability of the company, the state of business, transac-
tions which may have a material impact upon the profitability or liquidity
of the company, and the occurrence of other significant developments.62
Subject to exceptions, the supervisory board usually consists of
three members.63 This number can be altered in the saltzing (articles of
incorporation), but must always be divisible by three, and cannot, in any
event, exceed specified limits. These limits are related to the stated capi-
tal of the AG.64 However, if German codetermination laws apply, the
composition of the supervisory board will be governed by the codetermi-
nation laws, rather than by the AktG.65
60. AktG, supra note 53, § 84(1) (stating that the supervisory board shall appoint the
members of the management board); id. § 111(1) (stating that the supervisory board shall
supervise the management of the company).
61. See DGCL, supra note 33, § 170 (stating that the directors of every corporation
may declare and pay dividends); RMBCA, supra note 33, § 6.40 (stating that a board of
directors may authorize distributions to its shareholders).
62. AktG, supra note 53, § 90.
63. Id. § 95.
64. Id.
65. There are four main codetermination laws: The 1952 codetermination law does
not impose any requirements as to size on its own, but merely provides that the supervi-
sory board of any AG that falls within this law, and is not subject to an exemption from
the law, must ensure that one third of the supervisory board shall consist of employee
representatives. Therefore, the size of the supervisory board will be determined by the
AktG because the '52 codetermination law does not impose its own numerical require-
ments. Betriebsverfassungsgesetz vom 11. Oktober 1952 (BGB1. I S. 681), as amended
by Gesetz vom. 14. December 1976 (BGB1. I S. 3341) [hereinafter Codetermination Law
of 1952]. The 1951 codetermination law primarily applies to AGs engaged in the coal,
iron, or steel industries, and its application is limited to AGs with more than 1,000
employees. If this law applies, the supervisory board must consist of eleven members
unless the articles provide for a larger number. Of the eleven members, five must be
representatives of the stockholders, five representatives of the employees, and one is
elected by the shareholders upon a motion of the other members of the supervisory board.
Although the law allows the number of members to be increased by the articles, the
proportion of members elected by shareholders to members elected by employees must
remain the same, with election of the last member by stockholders upon motion of the
other members of the supervisory board. Gesetz ueber die Mitbestimmung der
Arbeitnehmer in den Aufsichtsraeten und Vorstaenden der Unternehmen des Bergbaus
und der Eisen und Stahl erzeugenden Industrie vom 21. Mai 1951 (BGB1. I S. 347), as
amended by Gesetz vom 6. September 1965 (BGB1. I S. 1185) [hereinafter
Codetermination Law of 1951]. The supplementary codetermination law applies to
holding companies in the coal, iron and steel industries. This law dictates composition of
supervisory boards of AGs which, although not themselves falling within the provisions
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German codetermination laws govern the number of members on
the supervisory board in qualifying AGs. These laws assign half of the
supervisory board seats to representatives of labor under the principle of
codetermination, allowing the shareholders to appoint the remaining
members.66 In AGs that are not governed by codetermination laws, the
AktG sets the number of supervisory board members depending on the
amount of the corporation's stated capital.67 For example, the law states
that the number of members for companies with a share capital of up to
1,500,000 euros68 shall be nine, of more than 1,500,000 euros shall be
fifteen, and of more than 10,000,000 euros shall be twenty-one. 69 Thus
the supervisory board may consist of up to twenty-one members, but the
number of members must always be divisible by three.
70
though not themselves falling within the provisions of the 1951 codetermination law, are
deemed to dominate an enterprise which is subject to the 1951 law. If these conditions
exist, the supplementary law might apply, depending on the gross turnover of the com-
bined group involved and the proportion of that gross turnover which is attributable to
sources in the coal, iron & steel industries. If the law applies, the supervisory board must
consist of fifteen members, with seven elected by shareholders, seven by employees, and
the last elected by shareholders upon a motion of the other members of the supervisory
board. Under certain circumstances, the articles may dictate higher number of members,
as long as the proportion of shareholder representatives to employee representatives stays
the same, with the last member elected by shareholders upon a motion of the other mem-
bers. Gesetz zur Ergaenzung des Gesetzes ueber die Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer
in den Aufsichtsraeten und Vorstaenden der Unternehmen des Berbaus und der Eisn und
Stahl erzuegenden Industrie vom 7. August 1956 (BGB1. I S. 707), as amended by Ge-
setz vom 27. April 1967 (BGB1. 1 S. 505) [hereinafter Supplementary Codetermination
Law]. The 1976 codetermination law applies to all AGs employing more than 2,000
workers and employees, which are not already covered by either the 1951 law or the sup-
plementary law. AGs with less than 2,000 workers are unaffected by the 1976 law, but
may still be subject to the 1951 law, supplementary law, or the 1952 law. Where the
1976 law applies, the size and composition of the supervisory board is determined by the
number of persons regularly employed by the AG. An AG that regularly employs up to
10,000 people will have a supervisory board of twelve members, with half representing
the shareholders, and half representing the employees. AGs with 10,000 - 20,000 em-
ployees will have sixteen members, and AGs with over 20,000 employees will have
twenty members on the supervisory board. Whatever the number of members on the su-
pervisory board, it must always retain the proportion of fifty percent representatives of
the shareholders and fifty percent representatives of the employees. Some of the em-
ployee representatives must be union representatives. Thus, where there are six or eight
employee representatives, two must be union representatives. Where there are ten em-
ployee representatives, three must be union representatives. Gesetz ueber die Mitbes-
timmung der Arbeitnehmer vom 4. Mai 1976 (BGB 1 S. 1153) [hereinafter Codetermi-
nation Law of 1976].
66. See id.
67. AktG, supra note 53, § 95.
68. As of Jan. 20, 2003, 1 euro equaled 1.06428 United States dollars. At this con-
version rate, 1,500,000 euros equals 1,596,394 United States dollars.
69. AktG, supra note 53, § 95.
70. Id.
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B. The Management Board
The members of the management board of a German corporation di-
rect the business of the AG on a day-to-day basis by managing the AG's
internal affairs and by representing it in the business world. 71 Hierarchy
among the members of the management board is prohibited by German
corporate law; all members are theoretically equal and each is usually in
charge of a defined area of the activities of the AG. 72 However, the su-
pervisory board may designate one person to act as the chairman of the
management board, although he or she does not gain any additional pow-
ers. 73 The management board bears the ultimate responsibility for the
management of the corporation's affairs, 74 unlike the officers of a corpo-
ration in the United States.75 The management board is appointed
through a resolution of the supervisory board.76 The supervisory board is
authorized to appoint members of the management board, and the ap-
pointment may be renewed or the term of office extended, provided that
the renewal or extension does not exceed five years.77 Management
board appointments must be accomplished by a resolution of the supervi-
sory board. Resolutions require a majority vote at a meeting of the su-
pervisory board at which a quorum is present. 78 The management board
is also authorized to promulgate the by-laws of the corporation, which
can only be accomplished through a umanimous vote of that board.79 In
theory, the management board is somewhat dependant on the supervisory
board. However, in reality, the supervisory board is also dependant on
the management board for the flow of information.
8 0
C. The Shareholders
Unlike shareholders of American corporations, shareholders of
71. Id. § 76.
72. Id. § 78.
73. Id. § 84.
74. AktG, supra note 53, § 76(1) (stating that the management board shall have di-
rect responsibility for the management of the company).
75. See DGCL, supra note 33, § 14 1(a) and RMBCA, supra note 33, § 8.0 1(b), stat-
ing that directors bear the ultimate responsibility for management of the corporation's
affairs.
76. AktG, supra note 53, § 84(1).
77. Id.
78. Id. § 108 (stating that the supervisory board shall decide by resolution and that
the default quorum requirement is not less than one-half of the number of members).
79. Id. § 77(2).
80. See, e.g., Theisen & Salzberger, supra note 55, (stating that in the case of the
Daimler/Chrysler merger in 1998, the supervisory board was informed only on the sixth
of May, the same day the Wall Street Journal reported the potential merger, and one day
before the merger was formally announced).
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German corporations have the power to amend the articles of incorpora-
tion and to declare dividends. 81  German shareholders also have the
power to elect the members of the supervisory board, which then ap-
points the managerial board.82 Similarly, American shareholders elect
the board of directors, which then appoints the officers of the corpora-
tion.83 However, private individual investors are less common in Ger-
many than they are in the United States. The majority of German inves-
tors are financial institutions and large investment blocks.
84
IV. Reform Attempts in the United States
Although statutes addressing the subject of corporate governance in
American corporations have traditionally been a product of state law, the
post-Enron United States has suddenly become more amenable to federal
legislation in this area. 85 This shift might be a sign of the growing ap-
proval of the "race to the bottom" theory, spurred by recent corporate
scandals. 86 One example of new federal corporate legislation is the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act of 2002, passed less than a year after Enron declared
87bankruptcy. Numerous federal bills have been proposed that contem-
81. AktG, supra note 53, § 119(1).
82. Id. (stating that election of members of the supervisory board shall take place at
the shareholders' meeting); id. at § 84(1) (stating that the supervisory board shall appoint
the members of the management board).
83. Id. § 101.
84. See Franck Chantayan, An Examination of American and German Corporate
Law Norms, 16 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 431, 445-47 (2002).
85. See NAT'L ASS'N OF CORPORATE DIR., REFORM SEASON: MORE THAN SOUND AND
FURY, in 1318 PRACTISING LAW INST. CORPORATE LAW & PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK
SERIES, 551, 557 (June-July 2002) [hereinafter NACD] (detailing post-Enron reform pro-
posals made by President Bush and by Congress).
86. The race to the bottom theory contends that in an effort to entice large companies
to incorporate in their state, legislators will make the laws of their state more manage-
ment-friendly by systematically eliminating or reducing shareholder protections. There-
fore, the only way to protect shareholder interests is to adopt federal minimum standards.
See e.g., William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware,
83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974); Donald E. Schwartz, A Case for Federal Chartering of Corpo-
rations, 31 BUS. LAW. 1125 (1976). Opponents of the race to the bottom theory argue
that market forces will cause shareholders to chose to invest in those corporations incor-
porated in the state with the most shareholder-friendly laws, and that management-
friendly corporations will suffer a decrease in stock price, causing corporations to even-
tually gravitate toward the states whose laws are more shareholder friendly. See e.g.,
Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corpora-
tion, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977). While these theories have existed for a long time, the
recent outbreak of corporate bankruptcies seems to have created renewed interest in fed-
eralizing shareholder interests.
87. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 116 Stat 745 (2002) [here-
inafter Sarbanes-Oxley Act]. The act is designed to increase accounting transparency of
the corporate auditing system, increase the independence of auditors and audit commit-
tees, codify ethical standards for accountants and key executive officers, enhance finan-
cial disclosure, prevent the profit-taking of corporate executives during pension plan
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plate countless ways of preventing future collapses similar to that of En-
ron.88  Additionally, the NASDAQ Stock Market, Inc., and the New
York Stock Exchange have also proposed their own guidelines for corpo-
rate governance reform, and the American Bar Association issued a Pre-
liminary Report of the Task Force on Corporate Responsibility (ABA
Report).89
A. Sarbanes-Oxley Act
On January 23, 2002, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 (Act).90 Some of the goals of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act include in-
creasing accounting transparency of the corporate auditing system, in-
creasing the independence of auditors and audit committees, codifying
ethical standards for accountants and key executive officers, enhancing
financial disclosure, preventing the profit-taking of corporate executives
during pension plan blackout periods, and increasing the fines, civil and
criminal liability for executives who fail to operate in a legal and ethical
manner.
91
Because the Enron and WorldCom scandals brought to light serious
deficiencies in corporate financial procedures, the Act focuses mainly on
audits, accounting, and other financial matters. 92 Although the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act is very important to corporate governance reform because it is
the first step toward federalized corporate governance standards, the Act
does not directly address the problem of inside directors, and therefore, is
inadequate to resolve the problems raised in this comment.
B. New York Stock Exchange Proposal
On February 13, 2002, former Securities Exchange Commission
(SEC) Chairman Harvey Pitt asked the New York Stock Exchange
blackout periods, and increase the fines, civil and criminal liability for executives who
fail to operate in a legal and ethical manner. Developments in Corporate Governance
Reform, CORPORATE DEP'T UPDATE (Aldrich & Bonnefin, P.L.C.), Aug 2002, at 1, avail-
able at http://www.bankerscompliancegroup.com/CorporateUpdate09-05-02.pdf (last
visited Jan. 7, 2003).
88. See NACD, supra note 85, at 558 (listing major reform bills, and stating that
"[t]he spring legislative session of the current Congress could well go down in history as
'Enron season').
89. ABA Report, supra note 22.
90. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 87. The Act is subdivided into eleven titles:
public company accounting oversight board; auditor independence; corporate responsibil-
ity; enhanced financial disclosures; analyst conflicts of interest; commission resources
and authority; studies and reports; corporate and criminal fraud accountability; white-
collar crime penalty enhancements; corporate tax returns; and corporate fraud and ac-
countability. Id § 1.
91. See Aldrich & Bonnefin, supra note 87.
92. Id.
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(NYSE) to review its corporate governance listing standards.93 Subse-
quently, the New York Stock Exchange appointed a Corporate Account-
ability and Listing Standards Committee (Committee) which drafted pro-
posals for corporate governance reform.94 These proposals will be
codified in § 303A of the New York Stock Exchange's Listed Company
Manual, and will apply to all companies listing common stock on that
Exchange.95
One rule recommended by the Committee requires that listed com-
panies have a majority of independent directors. 96 The Committee rea-
soned that "[e]ffective boards of directors exercise independent judgment
in carrying out their responsibilities. Requiring a majority of independ-
ent directors will increase the quality of board oversight and lessen the
possibility of damaging conflicts of interest., 97 The proposed rules de-
fine independent directors as those directors with no material relation-
ship with the listed company. 98 The proposed rules also require the inde-
pendent directors to hold regularly scheduled executive sessions in the
absence of management. 99 This rule is designed to encourage independ-
ent directors to be more autonomous. 00 However, the risk that directors
will continue to passively agree with management cannot be eliminated
93. Report of the NYSE Corporate Accountability and Listing Standards Committee,
June 6, 2002, available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/corpgovreport.pdf (last visited Jan.
15, 2003) [hereinafter NYSE Report].
94. NYSE Report, supra note 93, introduction.
95. Certain types of companies are exempted.
96. NYSE Report, supra note 93, introduction.
97. Id., recommendation.
98. Id. The Committee addresses the concept of director independence as follows:
" No director qualifies as "independent unless the board of directors affirmatively
determines that the director has no material relationship with the listed com-
pany (either directly or as a partner, shareholder or officer of an organization
that has a relationship with the company).
* In addition:
- No director who is a former employee of the listed company can be
"independent" until five years after the employment has ended.
- No director who is, or in the past five years has been, affiliated with
or employed by a (present or former) auditor of the company (or of
an affiliate) can be "independent" until five years after the end of ei-
ther the affiliation or the auditing relationship.
- No director can be "independent" if he or she is, or in the past five
years has been, part of an interlocking directorate in which an execu-
tive officer of the listed company serves on the compensation com-
mittee of another company that employs the director.
- Directors with immediate family members in the foregoing categories
must likewise be subject to the five-year "cooling-off' provisions for
purposes of determining "independence."
99. Id. This rule was designed to promote open discussion among the non-
management directors. NYSE Report, supra note 93, commentary.
100. Id., recommendation (requiring such sessions in an attempt to "empower non-
management directors to serve as a more effective check on management").
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unless the entire board is comprised of independent directors. Therefore,
this proposal is also an insufficient attempt at corporate governance re-
form.
C. NASDAQ Proposal
Pursuant to the SEC Chairman's request, NASDAQ also drafted a
proposal addressing corporate governance reform. 10 1 The proposal re-
quires independent directors to comprise a majority of the board of direc-
tors, and mandates that these independent directors regularly convene
executive sessions in the absence of inside directors or management.
0 2
The proposal also limits the types of payments an independent director
may accept.10 3 Directors are deemed not to be independent if any family
member of the director is, or has been within the past three years, em-
ployed as an executive officer of the corporation or any of its affiliates. 
04
Furthermore, a director is not independent if, within the past three years,
he or a member of his family not employed by the corporation has re-
ceived any payments in excess of $60,000, other than for service on the
board of directors. 0 5 This prevents an executive from quitting his job as
an officer to become an "independent" member of the board. Addition-
ally, NASDAQ has listed as a "proposal under consideration," a rule re-
quiring continuing education for all directors.
10 6
D. Preliminary10 7 Report of the American Bar Association Task Force
on Corporate Responsibility
In March of 2002, following the bankruptcy of Enron, the President
of the American Bar Association appointed a task force to investigate
corporate responsibility concerns.10 8 After conducting several formal
101. NASDAQ Corporate Governance Proposals, available at
http://www.nasdaq.com/about/WebCorpGov Summary%20Feb-revised.pdf (last re-





106. NASDAQ Proposal, supra note 101.
107. The report is a preliminary report - it has not been approved by the House of
Delegates or the Board of Governors of the American Bar Association and, accordingly,
should not be considered as representing the policy of the American Bar Association.
ABA Report, supra note 22, cover page.
108. The President of the American Bar Association charged the task force:
The Task Force on Corporate Responsibility shall examine systemic issues re-
lating to corporate responsibility arising out of the unexpected and traumatic
bankruptcy of Enron and other Enron-like situations which have shaken confi-
dence in the effectiveness of the governance and disclosure systems applicable
to public companies in the United States. The Task Force will examine the
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and informal meetings, drawing on the collective personal experience of
the members, the task force produced a preliminary report.10 9 The report
begins by recognizing that most executives, directors, and advisors act
honestly and in good faith, but sometimes they may "succumb to the
temptation to serve personal interests in maximizing their own wealth or
control at the expense of long-term corporate well-being." ' 10 The report
emphasizes the importance of oversight by independent members of the
corporate governance system, such as outside directors, outside auditors,
and outside counsel, to serve as a check on this temptation."' Therefore,
the report concludes that corporate responsibility and sound corporate
governance rely upon the these independent participants, who must be
empowered to act vigorously and in the best interests of the corpora-
tion. 1 12 Furthermore, these independent participants must be genuinely
dedicated to zealously executing their responsibilities.'
The ABA Report recommends that a "substantial majority" of the
members of the board of directors should be independent of manage-
ment, both in fact and in appearance.' 14 Like the NASDAQ proposal, the
ABA Report suggests that independent directors regularly hold executive
sessions outside the presence of any senior corporate officer or director
who is not independent. 15 While the report does not define "independ-
ent," it states that the Task Force supports the concepts of independence
advanced by the New York Stock Exchange Proposal." 16 While each at-
tempt at corporate governance reform is unique, most reflect a common
theme: the pressing need to reform the corporate governance structure of
American corporations-in particular, the need for the board of directors
to have more autonomy.
framework of laws and regulations and ethical principles governing the roles of
lawyers, executive officers, directors, and other key participants. The issues
will be studied in the context of the system of checks and balances designed to
enhance the public trust incorporate integrity and responsibility. The Task
Force will allow the ABA to contribute its perspectives to the dialogue now oc-
curring among regulators, legislators, major financial markets and other organi-
zations focusing on legislative and regulatory reform to improve corporate re-
sponsibility.





113. ABA Report, supra note 22.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See supra text accompanying note 98.
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V. Adoption of the German Two-Tier Board Structure in the United
States
In corporations with a unitary board system, the board often com-
plies with every decision management makes. Board members are often
uninformed, uninvolved, or unassertive, and they fail to adequately
monitor management of the corporation. This results in an entire board
that may be too compliant and submissive to serve as an effective check
on management. Alternatively, the directors may have a personal in-
volvement with the officers, preventing the board of directors from act-
ing as a genuine check on them.
The lack of separation between the board of directors and execu-
tives in American corporations has been a frequent target of criticism. 17
Adoption of a default corporate governance structure similar to that of
the German structure would have the potential to prevent corporate cor-
ruption by forcing a separation between those who manage the day-to-
day affairs of the corporation and those who appoint and oversee the
managers.118
A. The Benefits ofAdopting the German Model of Corporate Board
Structure
In light of Enron, the proposals of the New York Stock Exchange
and NASDAQ, and other recent proposals, the message is clear: "sub-
stantial changes are needed in corporate governance procedures in order
to create an environment for monitoring of management that will be ef-
fective." 19 Individuals intimately familiar with the German corporate
system attest to the fact that the "two-tier system does not display several
of the problems now being discussed in the UK or US .... ,,120 The two-
tier system would separate the functions of management and monitoring,
increase the accountability of management, implement a system of
checks and balances on the two governing bodies, allow for superior
feedback on management decisions, and result in less opportunity for
corruption to go unnoticed.
117. See Theisen & Salzberger, supra note 55.
118. There is already a distrust of corporate managers in the American system. See
Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 49 (1987) (stating that the American Law Institute's approach to corporate gov-
ernance continues to reflect some distrust of corporate managers).
119. Ruder, supra note 10.
120. Bertrand Benoit, Inside Track: Is Germany's Model Finding Its Level?, FIN.
TIMES, Sept. 5, 2002, available at
http://www.wiwi.hu.berlin.de/im/publikdlU2002presse03.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2003)
(quoting Karl-Hermann Baumann, chairman of the supervisory board of Sienens, a Ger-
man corporation, referring to the problem of the separation between the functions of
chairman and chief executive and the nomination of a lead independent director).
[Vol. 22:1
BOARD GAMES: GERMANY'S MONOPOLY
In the United States, it is common practice for the CEO of a corpo-
ration to also hold the position of chairman of the board of directors.
121
This practice began as a way of promoting a CEO when he performed
well, and soon evolved into a practice followed by two-thirds of U.S.
corporations. 22 Today, many CEOs demand to occupy the position of
chairman of the board, believing that they will appear to have a lower
status if they do not fill both positions. 23 While the combination of these
positions has the benefit of facilitating the CEO's job by making it faster
and easier to obtain the board's approval, and it serves as an incentive to
attract well qualified applicants to the position of CEO, the practice cre-
ates several governance problems. It forms a concentration of power, di-
lutes supervision of management, and renders the rest of the board of di-
rectors effectively useless.
Adoption of the German two-tier board structure would remedy the
problem of the executive director by forcing a separation between those
who manage the day-to-day affairs of the corporation and those who ap-
point and oversee these managers, resulting in more detached and objec-
tive oversight. Adoption of the German corporate structure in the United
States would have the desirable outcome of holding the officers of a cor-
poration accountable to a separate and distinct governing body. A two-
tier structure is necessary in order to have a true separation of the func-
tions of managing and supervising.
The supervisory board would also act as a breakwater for corrup-
tion. The type of corruption experienced by Enron would be less likely
to occur in a corporation with a two-tier board structure, 124 because ex-
ecutives would not "set, mark, and report on their own exam papers.
'' 25
The independence of the German supervisory board would result in
monitors that are more inclined and able to challenge the managers of the
corporation. 126 Institution of the German system would, in effect, impose
a system of checks and balances on those responsible for managing the
corporation.
Additionally, the division of power created through the two-tier
structure helps in the mediation of conflicts, allows access to superior
121. In fact, Ken Lay was both CEO and chairman of the board of directors of Enron.
122. Pearlstein, supra note 2.
123. Id.
124. See Eisenberg, supra note 37 (stating that in order for a board of directors to have
a monitoring board, as opposed to a managing board, the monitoring board must consist
of at least a majority of directors who are independent of the senior executives).
125. Roberto M. Herrera-Lim, Asian Institute of Management, The Case for Two-Tier
Boards in the Modern Corporation, at http://asiancorpgov.aim.edu.ph/issue2e.htm (last
visited Jan. 14, 2003).
126. See Pearlstein, supra note 2.
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feedback from stakeholders,' 27 and enhances the integrity of firm gov-
ernance. 128 The German system of corporate governance would have the
additional benefit of providing a long-term outlook without constricting
deal making, entrepreneurial talents, or the ability of the management
board to run the company.1
29
The concept of separating managerial functions from supervisory
functions is not a radical idea.' 30 The post-Enron United States considers
separation of the management and monitoring functions to be a keystone
of corporate governance reform. The New York Stock Exchange and
NASDAQ proposals for reform both include requirements that independ-
ent directors comprise a majority of the board of directors.' 31 Similarly,
the ABA Report 132 and the Business Roundtable's Principles of Corpo-
rate Governance (Roundtable Principles) 133 both recommend that the
board of directors be comprised of a "substantial majority" of independ-
ent directors, suggesting that more than a simple majority should be re-
quired.' 34 CFO Magazine stated that the idea of separating the CEO and
chairman roles is one idea that is most likely to be imported from Euro-
pean corporate practice.13 1 In fact, sixty-nine percent of the American
corporate directors surveyed recently stated that they would support a
move to separate the chairman and CEO roles.136 Bert Denton, president
of the New York based investment firm Providence Capital Inc., is plan-
127. The term "stakeholders" refers to owners, debtors, and employees of the corpo-
ration.
128. Herrera-Lim, supra note 125 (citing Shann Turnbul, Why Unitary Boards Are
Not Best Practice: A Case for Compound Boards, Paper delivered at the First European
Conference on Corporate Governance, Leuven, Belgium, Nov. 2000).
129. Id. (stating that the presence of a second-level board holds a promise of im-
proved oversight and monitoring of the company's direction, performance, and top man-
agement).
130. See, e.g., Felton & Watson, supra note 2 (stating that the essential objective in
corporate governance reform must be to reestablish the balance between management and
the board so that the former runs the company while the latter contributes to its strategic
and operational development and provides the oversight needed to satisfy shareholders).
131. NYSE Report, supra note 93; NASDAQ Proposals, supra note 101.
132. ABA Report, supra note 22.
133. Business Roundtable Principles of Corporate Governance, May 2002, and its
related July 2002 statement, available at http://www.brt.org/press.cfm/728 (last visited
Jan. 8, 2003) [hereinafter Roundtable Principles].
134. See ABA Report, supra note 22; Roundtable Principles, supra note 133.
135. Craig Schneider, Transatlantic Answers: Can U.S. Regulators Improve Corpo-
rate Governance at Home by Looking Overseas?, CFO MAGAZINE, Oct. 17, 2002, avail-
able at http://www.cfo.com/printarticle/0,5317,7777,00.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2003).
136. Id. (stating that U.S. executives are enamored with the idea of splitting the CEO
and chairman roles. A combined sixty-nine percent of respondents in McKinsey & Co.'s
2002 Director Opinion Survey on Corporate Governance either very much support or
somewhat support the move. However, to date, less than twenty percent of companies
have actually adopted the practice, according to Bert Denton, president of the New York
based investment firm Providence Capital Inc.).
[Vol. 22:1
BOARD GAMES: GERMANY'S MONOPOLY
ning a campaign to encourage American boards to switch to a nonexecu-
tive chairman of the board.
While efforts like those of Mr. Denton are laudable, many firms will
not adopt such measures until they are mandated by law.' 37 Furthermore,
although a separation of the roles of the CEO and chairman is a good
start, it is not sufficient without further reform. A two-tier structure, one
in which the board is wholly independent of officers, is necessary in or-
der to have a true separation of the functions of managing and supervis-
ing. Therefore, federal legislation implementing a two-tier board struc-
ture is both advantageous and necessary to achieve a more efficient
corporate board structure in the United States.
B. The Biggest Problems Encountered in the German System of
Corporate Governance Could be Avoided in the United States
The German system has often been criticized by American scholars
and others for the extent to which large German banks control the corpo-
rate world.138 Another criticism of the German system has focused on
the codetermination laws of that country.' 39 These problems could be
avoided in the United States by selectively implementing only the board
structure of German corporations, rather than the entire German corpo-
rate system.
1. American Banks Will Not Control the Corporate World
Because They Are Prohibited From Doing So.
Prior to the Great Depression, banks played a large role in corporate
governance-a role similar to that of German banks in German
corporations. 140  However, this relationship was often viewed critically
137. Id. (stating that although sixty-nine percent of directors surveyed supported a
split of the chairman and CEO roles, less than twenty percent of companies have actually
adopted the practice).
138. See Thomas J. Andre, Jr., Some Reflections on German Corporate Governance:
A Glimpse at German Supervisory Boards, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1819, 1822 (1996) (stating
that much of the criticism of the German system of corporate governance focuses on the
fact that the supervisory boards of many large German companies are dominated by rep-
resentatives of major German banks); see also Practical Law Company, Law Department
UK, Corporate Governance, The German Two Tier Board, at
http://lduk.practicallaw.com/scripts/article.asp?ArticleID=3237 (last visited Jan. 14,
2003) (stating that one of the structural flaws of the German system is that the appoint-
ment procedures are suspect because companies tend to have strong long term relation-
ships with their banks, which is often reflected in the make-up of the supervisory boards.
In fact, "[tlhe chair is often a banker who dominates the supervisory board").
139. See infra text accompanying note 151.
140. LESTER C. THuRow, HEAD TO HEAD, 135-36 (1992); see Corinne A. Franzen,
Note, Increasing the Competitiveness of U.S. Corporations: Is Bank Monitoring the An-
swer?, 2 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 271, 275 (stating that the Glass-Steagal Act was Con-
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because of the potential for banks to manipulate certain companies. 141
The Glass-Steagal Act142 separates commercial banks from investment
banks, and prohibits commercial banks in the United States from
entering into the securities business. 43 Under the Glass-Steagal Act, a
bank may not underwrite, distribute, sell, or deal in corporate securities,
except on its own account. 144 The Act also states that banks may not
affiliate with any company engaged principally in underwriting
securities. 145  Commercial banks are prohibited from managing a
company engaged primarily in the securities business, 146 and investment
banks may not accept deposits. 47 Although there have been movements
to repeal this act, 148 and commercial banks have had some success in
gress' response to charges against some banks of conflict of interest and fraud and the
fear of banks taking similar risks with depositor money after the stock market collapse
and during the Great Depression).
141. Examples of this manipulation include: bankers loaning money to customers to
purchase equities sold by the bank's own securities departments, often at inflated prices;
banks purchasing overvalued stocks from their securities affiliates to place in customers'
trust accounts; and banks raising money for their customers by selling stock whose pro-
ceeds were used to pay off outstanding bank loans before a company failed. Franzen,
supra note 140 (citing MICHAEL T. JACOBS, SHORT-TERM AMERICA 144 (1991)).
142. Banking Act of 1933, ch.89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 12, 15, and 39 U.S.C. (1988)) [hereinafter Glass-Steagal Act].
143. Id.
144. Id. Section 16 states:
The business of dealing in securities and stock by the association shall be lim-
ited to purchasing and selling such securities and stock without recourse, solely
upon the order, and for the account of, customers, and in no case for its own
account, and the association shall not underwrite any issue of securities or
stock; Provided, that the association may purchase for its own account invest-
ment securities under such limitations and restrictions as the Comptroller of the
Currency may by regulation prescribe.
Id. § 16 (emphasis in original).
145. Id. Section 20 provides: "[N]o member bank shall be affiliated in any man-
ner... with any corporation... or other similar organization engaged principally in the
issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution... of stocks, bonds, debentures,
notes, or other securities." Id. § 20.
146. Id. Section 32 prohibits directors, officers, or employees of banks from simulta-
neously holding similar positions at firms "primarily engaged in the issue, flotation,
underwriting, public sale or distribution... [of] securities." Id. § 32.
147. Id. Section 21 prohibits:
any person, firm, corporation, association, business trust, or other similar or-
ganization, engaged in the business of issuing, underwriting, selling, or distrib-
uting, at wholesale or retail, or through syndicate participation, stocks, bonds,
debentures, notes or other securities, to engage at the same time to any extent
whatever in the business of receiving deposits subject to check or to repayment
upon presentation of a passbook, certificate of deposit, or other evidence of
debt, or upon request of the depositor ....
Glass-Steagal Act, supra note 106, § 21.
148. Id.; see Steven Lipin & Timothy L. O'Brien, Repeal of Glass Steagal May Hit
Wall With Takeover Wave, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 1995 at Cl.
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expanding their powers, 149 the current law forbids the trespass of banks
into the securities market.
2. The Two-Tier Board System Could Be Implemented in the
United States Without Codetermination.
The codetermination laws of Germany may be the most controver-
sial aspect of the German corporate system, and a cause of much unspo-
ken frustration among German executives. 50  These laws have been a
major source of criticism, both in the United States and in Germany.'
51
Joachim Schwalbach, of Berlin's Humboldt University, states that "[t]his
is the only country in the world that thinks co-determination is the right
way to make corporate decisions."
'1 2
However, Germany's two-tier system of corporate governance
could be implemented in the United States without codetermination,
eliminating yet another major problem with the German system of corpo-
rate governance. Proof that a corporation with a two-tier system of cor-
porate governance can function independently of codetermination is
found in the fact that those AGs which do not qualify under one of Ger-
many's four codetermination laws are successfully governed under the
two-tier system of corporate governance in the absence of codetermina-
tion laws.
VI. Conclusion
In the aftermath of numerous corporate scandals in the United
States, Americans have been left searching for answers. The German
model of corporate governance offers a practical answer. The two-tier
system would provide American corporations with a better means of
monitoring the actions taken by those who manage the day-to-day opera-
149. See Frank M. Tavelman, Note, American Banks or the Glass-Steagall Act-
Which Will Go First?, 21 Sw. U. L. REv. 1511, 1514-16 (1992) (listing the areas in which
commercial banks have expanded their powers under the Glass-Steagal Act).
150. Benoit, supra note 120.
151. See Chantayan, supra note 84, at 450-51 (2002) (stating that one problem affect-
ing a vibrant capital market in Germany is codetermination); Mark J. Roe, German Code-
termination and German Securities Markets, 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 199, 201 (1999) (stat-
ing that the "codetermination structure fits poorly with diffuse ownership"); Gerald L.
Neuman & Mark J. Roe, Convergence and Diversity in Private and Public Law, 5
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 181, 183 (discussing Freidrich Kubler's belief that codetermination is
one of the reasons why the German securities markets are weak).
152. Benoit, supra note 120 (quoting Joachim Schwalbach, head of the management
institute at Humboldt University and one of Germany's most virulent opponents of co-
determination. The article also quotes a supervisory board member who states that "[a]
lot of the criticism that is leveled at the board relates to co-determination ... [b]ut I am
skeptical that we will ever have a reform").
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tions of the corporation. Furthermore, while adopting the benefits of the
German system, the United States could avoid those portions of the
German system that are undesirable or would not mesh well with Ameri-
can corporate norms-those of codetermination and control by banking
institutions. This modified German system is a sensible answer to the
many questions raised by the recent wave of corporate corruption in the
United States.
